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The difficulty in procuring for America an arsenal adequate to en-
sure national security at the lowest possible price is no more insolv-
able than dozens of other problems the American people face.
Critics of the procurement process too often fail to understand,
though, that the business of supplying our nation's defense needs
cannot be analyzed in exactly the same terms as, for example, the
business of supplying consumer goods - or even most commercial
goods and services. The purchase of a hammer from a defense con-
tractor may in fact be a different kind of transaction than the
purchase of a hammer from a hardware store. How it is different -
and whether it should be different - is at the heart of the defense
procurement debate. Understanding the differences will point the
way toward potential solutions of very real problems.
There is, it should be noted at the outset, a complication, because
there is no monolithic "defense industry." The suppliers that share
that nomenclature manufacture ships, rockets, jets, jet engines, can-
teens, and literally thousands of other items that make up the na-
tional arsenal.
The U.S. government, however, is a one-of-a-kind customer for
much of the American defense industry. This customer, in buying
major systems, wants high-technology products that perform unique
tasks, products that are capable of surviving in a wide range of envi-
ronments and that can be maintained by a young work force of vol-
unteers with limited training and skills. Many of these products
have no other market. Because of the complexity and diversity of
these major defense systems, their design requirements, and the
limited market for them, only a few industrial enterprises have the
skills and capabilities to pursue any segment of that market. The
skills and experience of these enterprises are a national resource -
the corporate knowledge is of no less value because it is obtained at
a price in the marketplace.
What developed in response to this unique relationship between
customer and supplier was neither better nor worse than what ex-
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isted in other commercial markets. But it was different. It
prompted ways of doing business on both sides that might not have
been appropriate in other situations. But in the case of America's
national defense, the accommodations produced an arsenal that was
- and still is - the envy of the world.
Few industries, perhaps not even the electric utilities, could argue
that they are more highly regulated than defense contractors. Both
Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) have a profound
influence on every aspect of defense-related transactions, with rights
accruing to DoD as a customer that are unique in the American mar-
ketplace. There are DoD regulations that control the recovery of
costs; prescribe accounting procedures and systems; mandate dis-
closure of proprietary financial data; provide for on-site inspection
quality reviews; require delivery of comprehensive manufacturing
data; and provide for oversight of virtually every aspect of manage-
ment decisionmaking.
Because of the marketing environment for major defense systems
- a few suppliers of unique, complex products to one customer - I
believe that the business relationship between the U.S. government
and its defense contractors will always be different from other com-
mercial relationships. The systems governing DoD purchases can
be changed; undoubtedly, they can and will be improved. However,
suggestions that the business relationship between Washington and
the defense industry will be indistinguishable from the relationship
between any customer and supplier do not adequately take account
of the economic realities of the market, or the unique needs of DoD.
As with any other emotionally driven public policy issue, fueled in
the case of defense procurement by "horror stories" based on the
worst kind of misinformation, solutions can overreach the real
problems. As a Central Intelligence Agency analyst's report put it:
Mistrust appears to pervade U.S. weapons procurement like nowhere
else in the world. It's as though the system assumes that the partici-
pants in defense programs can't be trusted, and may even force those
participants to live down to that mistrust.'
What then has prompted the crisis in confidence focused on the
defense procurement system?2 In part, it comes from the unusual
1. U.S. Urged to Emulate Others in Arms Purchasing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8. 1986, at
A24, col. I (quoting CIA analyst Robert A. Magnan).
2. In aJanuary 1986 survey ordered by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management, 58% of those Americans surveyed, when asked how much waste
they thought there was in military spending, said "a lot," and another 32% said "some."
Public Voices Faith in Jli/itarv. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
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nature of the business of national defense - a concept, indeed a
reality, far removed from the experience of most Americans. As
Herbert Stein, a member of the President's Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion on Defense Management (hereinafter referred to as the Pack-
ard Commission), and former chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, put it: "Defense spending... is a peculiarly difficult sub-
ject to think about. People trying to figure out whether the country
is spending the right amount, or spending in the right ways, quickly
learn that many critical details are known only to a few specialists." 3
The American taxpayer finds it difficult to relate to the rebuilding
of our national defense in times of relative peace around the world.
The method of satisfying needs for most consumer goods and serv-
ices in the American economy is perceived to be off-the-shelf, and
on demand. Concepts of lead-time for development, production,
and deployment are difficult to comprehend. In general, the Ameri-
can public does not relate to the products, the process, or the
problems of defense procurement.
To state such a thesis is neither to indict the citizenry nor to sug-
gest that they must better educate themselves about the reality of
the situation. The public is not less intelligent in 1986 than it was in
1946, but its trust in the system has been damaged by reckless and
often politically motivated charges of fraud and waste. The percep-
tion of the defense industry as dishonest or unethical has weakened
the basic American trust in the credibility of the system.
Congress must accept some share of blame for encouraging the
level of mistrust.
[T]hanks in great measure to constant interference from Congress, all
weapons development and deployment in the U.S. are taking too long
and costing too much. An incredible bureaucracy has built up around
the U.S. weapons program, attributable in part to the constant drum-
beat of politically motivated charges of "waste, fraud and abuse"....4
While such hyperbole may be secretly satisfying to defense con-
tractors, Congress is, in part, mirroring the real concern of the pub-
lic it represents. But is the Pentagon staffed by officers so venal and
so foolish, that it would purposely waste taxpayer dollars on over-
priced, uncompetitive weaponry? Of course not. To look at just
one example - pricing of spare parts - will shed some light on the
root causes of the distrust.
3. Stein, [hy Defense is Mismanaged, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1986. at 177.




When the federal government accepts an aircraft engine delivery
from a contractor, the government has generally spent one to one-
and-a-half times that initial cost for spare parts and maintenance
over the twenty-five to thirty years of engine life. That added busi-
ness has, for the most part, been directed to the prime contractor,
even for parts that the prime contractor subcontracted to other sup-
pliers. For those subcontracted parts, the price paid - through a
purchase from the prime contractor - will, of course, include mark-
ups, and will thus be higher than it would be if the parts were
purchased directly from the original subcontractor.
Why does a customer pay more than he has to for parts or serv-
ices? Either he is wasteful and foolish, or he perceives some value-
added from the supplier with the higher price. The Pentagon and
its prime contractors understand the concept of value-added for
spare parts, but they have not explained it very well to the outside
world. Prime contractors, of course, benefit by retaining that spare
parts business; it provides a stable source of income and it assures
the continuity of a particular technology development and
workforce. But in addition, the contractor's reputation is strongly
influenced by the performance record - good or bad - of the en-
gines sold to the federal government. To enhance that reputation, a
supplier is motivated to support its products in use.
What are the benefits to the customer of this relationship? The
value-added ranges from quality assurance, through inspection and
laboratory analysis, to engineering support and the expertise to di-
agnose and solve technical problems. It involves continued supervi-
sion and control of design, manufacturing and logistical support of
complex and sophisticated products. When technical judgment is
essential, this coordinated effort cannot be avoided, although it
could conceivably be shifted to the government, or to another con-
tractor. Would the associated costs be avoided? No, they would be
transferred - transferred with the risk of degrading safety and qual-
ity standards. Certainly, no single answer is appropriate, because
total cost in some cases can be reduced without unacceptable
consequences.
In other words, there are no good guys and bad guys in this sce-
nario. For items that do not require highly specialized design con-
trol and product support, good business sense suggests that the
prime contractors, and their value-added mark-up, be avoided. A
viable contractor will recover its costs in the prices of its products.
In government sales, these costs are assigned to products through
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regulated cost accounting practices. The costs of a high-technology
aerospace concern will not be the same as those of a corner hard-
ware store. When the overhead of a high-technology manufacturer
is applied to a low-technology item, the resulting price will appear
higher than the intrinsic value of the item. Many of the problems
associated with apparent pricing irregularities can be avoided by
making purchases from an appropriate source. Buy a claw hammer
from a hardware store, and buy an axial flow compressor from a jet
engine manufacturer.
Like so much of the defense procurement equation, the spare
parts issue involves trade-offs, rather than the conquering of evil by
good. The government's estimated savings from avoiding prime
contractor mark-ups must be judged against the value represented
by those mark-ups. As the government moves to break out spare
parts from the prime contractor, the prime loses quality control and
traceability for parts incorporated into systems - some of which are
warranteed.
Improvements in spare parts acquisition can, and should, be
made. As the peculiarities of the system are identified and re-
sponded to, and as DoD seeks out improvements that won't damage
national defense, changes will evolve. As with any enormous en-
deavor, the defense procurement system has generated inefficien-
cies that can be eased, if not eliminated. The creation of an
unyielding rulebook, however, is not the solution. The role played
by the judgment of purchasing officials cannot be overlooked, and
flexibility should be preserved to utilize purchasing techniques that
are appropriate to the circumstances. Many purchasing techniques,
including, of course, competition among qualified suppliers, can be
effective, if we avoid creating rigid rules that may make sense in one
context but not in another. The present spare parts situation is not a
crisis. The present spare parts procurement system, on the whole,
is rational, and its evolution has been reasonable. The evolution
will continue, as we learn to avoid unnecessary overhead costs while
continuing the involvement of prime contractors in appropriate
circumstances.
Charges of spare parts overpricing have been the subject of
countless investigations, audits, congressional hearings, and media
reports in recent years. In all of that, including the $30 machine
screws and the $2,000 pair of pliers, there have been relatively few
cases of profiteering by defense contractors, given the number and




uting to the seemingly out-of-line prices have been such things as
small, non-economic quantity orders, start-up costs relating to items
no longer in production, and legitimate mark-ups for overhead and
support. What is often overlooked is that the prices were reflective
of costs actually incurred and spread across contract items under ac-
counting treatments developed with the government. That is not to
say that some of the more foolish-looking examples of high-priced
hammers or screwdrivers are ideal examples of procurement at its
best, but it does suggest that, under current procurement regula-
tions, the prices for the overwhelming majority of parts and services
are supported by underlying value and, moreover, are deemed "fair
and reasonable" according to the regulations. The current procure-
ment environment has sensitized contractors and DoD to out-of-line
pricing on commercially available parts. Both parties recognize the
value of finding alternative sources for low-cost equipment that is
burdened with overhead if purchased from prime contractors as
part of a major program.
The history of the procurement system has been marked by flexi-
bility and change. The spare parts contracting and pricing system
that generates headlines today was developed during the 1960s and
early 1970s, when DoD supported high-technology weapons sys-
tems primarily through sole-source contracts from prime contrac-
tors. As the systems grew in quality and sophistication in the mid-
1960s, the government procured large numbers of current parts
from prime contractors, without the need for enormous federal
staffing with engineers, quality-control professionals, or procure-
ment experts. Prime contractors comprehensively managed spare
parts acquisitions, under DoD supervision.
The new political environment requires changes in that system,
and in response to public and political pressure, procurement re-
form is now in full gear. Competition is now firmly rooted in new
legislation and regulations. DoD has more auditors and contract
professionals, and a number of the services provided by prime con-
tractors are being assumed by the government. What cannot be for-
gotten in all this is the enormity of the task. No policy adjustment
in, for example, the spare parts arena, will have an immediate, dra-
matic impact on the cost of defense or the precision with which pro-
curement is conducted. According to the Pentagon's Defense Spare
Parts Initiative office, DoD processes more than 15 million procure-
ment transactions, through approximately 1,000 buying offices, do-
ing business with 300,000 different vendors. DoD manages about
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4.3 million separate stock-numbered items, issues over $100 billion
in spare parts each year, and buys another $35 billion in secondary
items each year. 5
The "new" system can function; much of what is new has existed
in the past, in different circumstances. What remains to be an-
swered is whether the problems that developed in the past - the
problems that prompted changes in procurement - have indeed
been cured, and whether "solutions" will generate problems of their
own.
In addition to flexibility of approach, the procurement system
should encourage stability of programs and funding. Multi-year
procurement (MYP) is one strategy that seems capable of reducing
costs, whether or not other parts of the procurement program are in
place. A carefully constructed multi-year system would have the
ability to maximize DoD buying power, while also improving pro-
ductivity through more efficient use of labor and increased corpo-
rate capital investment to enhance production capabilities. Multi-
year procurement appears to be good policy for both government
and industry.
In President Reagan's April 24, 1986 message to Congress, "De-
fense Establishment: Message to the Congress Outlining Proposals
for Improvement," he noted:
For many years, there has been chronic instability in both top-line
funding and individual programs. This has eliminated key economies
of scale, stretched out programs, and discouraged defense contractors
from making long-term investments required to improve productivity.
To end this costly cycle, we must find ways to provide the stability that
will allow the genius of American ingenuity and productivity to
flourish.63
Indeed, the President might have added that the United States is the
only nation in the world that operates with a one-year defense
budget; most countries have a three-to-five-year commitment. 7
The problem faced by MYP advocates is the reluctance of Con-
gress to commit to long-term planning that might reduce its flexibil-
ity. Multi-year procurement requires up-front planning and a
prompt coming together of industry, DoD, and congressional inter-
ests. Under the traditional annual DoD budget cycle, Congress en-
5. Marshall, Logistics: Does the Tail Wag the Tiger?, DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Aug./Sept. 1986, at 29, 29.
6. 22 WEEK Y COMP. PRES. Doc. 539, 544 (Apr. 28, 1986); see also Aerospace Daily,
May 1, 1986, at 183.





joys the freedom to make sweeping program changes in response to
public and political pressures of the moment. Congress takes com-
fort in being able to adjust each element of the defense budget on
an annual basis - and that instinct is not without its justification.
Internal and domestic economic and political conditions do change
over periods far shorter than three to five years.
The blame, moreover, does not lie with Congress alone. The de-
fense industry and DoD have also not been geared towards the long-
term planning necessary to make MYP work. Industry must take the
initiative to identify, early in a program, the proposed benefits of
multi-year procurement. DoD must commit to MYP early in the
program life of a system in order to give Congress ample time for
review and analysis. In the end, Congress must accept that the ben-
efits of three-to-five-year MYP are worth the risk of commitment and
the loss of annual budget flexibility.
Multi-year procurement has generated considerable support
among defense planners for a number of years. In December of
1980, the Defense Industrial Base Panel of the Committee on
Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives concluded a
study of the condition of the U.S. defense industrial base. One of
the major findings of the panel was:
Present policies and procedures for the procurement of property and
services by the Department of Defense are excessively inflexible and
discourage the use of contract types that would promote the best in-
terests of the United States; as a result, many procurement contracts
cannot be written [in such a way] that would promote stability, en-
courage capital formation, and lead to efficiencies that would result in
savings to the government.8
As a result of this finding, the panel made the following
recommendations:
[E]stablish a policy for defense procurement that will promote flexibil-
ity and permit the use of contract types, including multiyear contract tpes,
that will result in the acquisition of weapon systems and other items in
the most timely, economic and efficient manner; and provide that con-
tracting, where practicable, should provide incentives to defense con-
tractors to make economic purchases of material and to improve
productivity by investment in technology, capital facilities and
equipment.!'
8. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAl. BASE PANElt, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMM., THE AILING
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: UNREADY FOR CRISIS, H.R. Doc. No. 29, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 1 (1980).
9. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
127
Yale Law & Policy Review
Since its inception in 1963, MYP has been periodically maligned
and praised as a method of improving defense procurement effi-
ciency.' 0 Every program is not appropriate for MYP, but many in
DoD, Congress, and the defense industry believe it offers efficien-
cies that do not require major adjustments to the existing procure-
ment systems. MYP has, in fact, saved $6.2 billion since DoD began
a major initiative in 1982.11 The 1987 DoD Authorization Act in-
cludes incentives for increased use of MYP, establishing a goal of
MYP use for 10 percent of procurement programs for fiscal year
1988.12 This signal from Congress is encouraging.
Options such as MYP require a renewed sense of cooperation
among Congress, DoD, and defense contractors. Legislative and
administrative bludgeoning of the relationship between DoD and its
contractors has the potential to damage the very cooperation neces-
sary to produce appropriate results.
The authority of the government's contracting officers has eroded
and has been supplanted by a swarm of auditors and investigators.
The result is a relationship that is legalistic and adversarial - the
criminalization of the procurement process. The recently enacted
False Claims Amendments Act, 13 a revision of a Civil War-era piece
of legislation, creates contractor liability for false statements, liabil-
ity independent of knowledge, culpability, or intent. This legisla-
tion would seem to strip individuals and companies of the most
elementary protection of law. Defendants could be fined $10,000
for each false statement made to a federal agency, regardless of
whether the defendant knew the statement was false, or whether the
government suffered a loss as a consequence. 14 The National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers and a number of other business-related
groups have indicated that such legislation would "have an espe-
cially negative impact upon small and medium-sized businesses ...
with a lessening of their normal procedural and substantive rights
... ."15 Defenders of this legislation envision defense-industry em-
10. For a thorough review of MYP history, see J.C. RITTER, MULTI-YEAR PROCURE-
MENT IN THE REQUISITION OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS (1984) (Unpublished Thesis,
MIT).
11. See Federal Contracts Report, Apr. 28, 1986, at 810.
12. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,§ 911, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) Vol. 11.
13. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) No. 10A,
amending 18 U.S.C. § 287 and scattered sections of Title 31.
14. Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) No.
IOA.





ployees "forced into a conspiracy of silence out of fear that they will
lose their jobs if they speak up"' 6 when they uncover wrong-doing
related to defense work. This over-wrought description has some
legitimacy, which is to the shame of the companies that create such
fear. But the industry has already responded, with a major effort by
contractors to establish a comprehensive ombudsman program to
deal with alleged illegal or unethical acts within their companies.
These programs generally take one of two forms. Either in a
fairly narrow program, a "contract compliance" officer will be avail-
able to solicit complaints, or, as is the case in my own corporation,
United Technologies, a broad, two-way communications program
that solicits and responds to employee queries about any business-
related subject may be established. In either system, the intent is to
guarantee confidentiality. Basically, if in the opinion of an employee
an issue is of sufficient importance or sensitivity that it should be
known to executives, the ombudsman vehicle is available.
The ombudsman programs are long overdue. The effort is a
good business practice, and it serves as an early-warning system for
violations of the complex government regulations under which de-
fense workers operate. A firm commitment to complete honesty
and compliance, with protection for "whistleblowers," is a much-
needed and firmly stated element of the various defense industry
ombudsman programs.
It is essential to recognize that the vast majority of "false state-
ments" made in the course of defense work involve inadvertent er-
ror, in the face of strict regulation of dynamic, high-technology
processes. I do not intend to suggest that inadvertence, or even
good faith, are sufficient to absolve contractors of all responsibility.
But on important matters of national defense and security, we must
look to contract remedies and move away from criminal sanctions
for much of what falls under the rubric of "waste, fraud and abuse."
Most defense-related auditing decisions involve judgments on tech-
nical engineering issues, or costing techniques that are "obscure
even to a trained expert."' 7 Moreover, "defense firms typically face
an array of 44,000 specifications; the instruction book on procure-
ment runs thirty-two volumes and takes up six feet of shelf space."' 8
16. Phillips, Some Incentives for Whistle-Blowers, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1986, at 28, col. 5.
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This complexity obscures responsibility rather than assigning it.
As the judge in a criminal "false statements" prosecution against
defense contractor General Dynamics Corporation put it: "Faced
with such an infrangible mass, even if a Court were able to read and
understand the words in a contract like the one involved here, it
would have made little headway toward reasoned analysis."' 9
As the Packard Commission pointed out, very few of the problems
with defense procurement are related to greed or unethical activities
on the part of contractors. The Pentagon and its contractors have
proven to be quite capable of resolving such problems, while main-
taining an adequate national defense. It is reasonable to assert that
"[i]f the Pentagon is to be performance oriented instead of looking
constantly over its shoulder, Congress will have to stop treating it as
a gold mine of scandals to publicize and exploit." 20
Congressional oversight has become unnecessarily burdensome
not only to the contractors engaged in defense business, but also to
the DoD regulators most directly involved in the day-to-day deci-
sionmaking. Today, more than ninety-six congressional committees
and subcommittees summon witnesses to testify on defense pro-
grams: this number represents a 357 percent increase in the last
thirteen years. DoD, in connection with 1984 budget requests, fur-
nished 1,306 witnesses, who provided 2,160 hours of testimony. In
addition, the department responded to 85,000 written congres-
sional inquiries and submitted 21,753 pages of supporting docu-
ments related to the budget.2 '
If the nation's defense procurement system was truly in shambles,
rife with dishonesty and fraud, the wave of indignation would be
justifiably strong. But such is not the case. Lost in the rhetoric are
19. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1504 (C.D. Cal.
1986). Judge Fernandez' comments are incisive:
The defense industry in this country is highly regulated .... [T]hrough its power
over the purse, the Government has acquired detailed control over the actions of its
contractors. It has done so through webs of laws, regulations, and directives, that
can almost defy understanding as they descend to the smallest details, and ascend to
the most grandiose plans .... Government regulation of the defense industry pro-
ceeds through contracts laced with specialized provisions and jargon, sets of mili-
tary specifications, regulations, on the spot inspections, management systems,
review committees, contracting officers, and a myriad of other devices, all of which
are designed to assure the ultimate protection of the national interests, both tech-
nologically and economically.... Only an extreme case of hubris could convince a
district judge that all of this was simply within his conventional experience, and only
a gross form of pertinacity would cause him to cling to that opinion once he had
been given the opportunity for enlightenment.
United States v. General Dynamics Corp. at 1503-04.
20. Mr. Packard Reports, Wall St. J., July 7, 1986, at 12, col. 1.




the more realistic characterizations - dull, but true. The govern-
ment "is buying much-needed military improvements for less than
expected and getting maximum payoff from taxpayers' dollars
through sound management." 22
We face an additional problem in trying to minimize costs, be-
cause as suspicion has become more intense, as weaponry has be-
come more complex, and as costs have risen, the procurement
process has become increasingly slow and unresponsive. In the
mid- to late 197 0s, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
needed about ninety days to launch a new project. It now takes
DARPA more than 180 days to start a new program, from the deci-
sion to fund the program until the contractor can begin work. With
the fullest, most formal paperwork, about 260 days are required.
DARPA officials concede the problem and are working to resolve it,
given the environment in which they must operate.23
Throughout this analysis of defense procurement, I have been
rather kind to the contractors themselves, my company included.
The defense contractors, despite much rhetoric to the contrary,
have become as comfortable with the present' system as have Con-
gress and the Department of Defense. We have been reluctant to
reform the system, just as we have been reluctant to criticize the
changes that have been proposed - in part, because the changes
are being initiated by our customer, the U.S. government.
Murray L. Weidenbaum, the first chairman of President Reagan's
Council of Economic Advisors, has contributed wise analysis of de-
fense procurement - and how to revise the process:
The key to making defense contracting more efficient is an increased
reliance on private enterprise. Actually, we have not given it much of a
chance. Defense contracts are awarded to private companies. But the
contracts require the companies to behave like arsenals. Rather than
concentrating on performance, contractors spend their time studying
the government's rule books. Thus, the nation does not now get the
full benefit of the innovation and efficiency that we expect from the
private sector. 24
According to a 1980 Electronic Engineering Times estimate, "50 per-
cent of small, high-technology defense contractors were either go-
ing bankrupt or dropping out of competition for government
22. Taft, Defense Costs, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1986, at 12 (letter to the editor, from
William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense).
23. DARPA Wants Procurement Streaminingfor Prototype Initiative, Aerospace Daily, Oct.
8, 1986, at 41.
24. Weidenbaum, A Way to Control Defense Costs, Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 23,
1984, at 12.
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contracts, largely due to government regulation. The number of
aerospace suppliers fell to 3,000 in 1980 from 6,000 in 1967."25
My faith in the defense procurement system is a faith based on the
commitment and expertise of the private-sector defense contractors,
in concert with DoD and Congress. It is a system unique to the
products being offered, but it is a system that utilizes the same basic
honesty and success that has marked the American economy for so
many decades. Men and women of good will throughout the system
are committed to improving it, but "reform" moves slowly through
the inherent complexities of the nation's procurement process. The
speed at which change is occurring may seem painfully slow, but this
is due in part to the lack of precision available to evaluate what effect
reform has had thus far.
A General Accounting Office report from November of 1986 re-
flects the frustration of all concerned parties. The conclusion,
based on surveys of 156 top procurement officers in DoD and pri-
vate industry, asserts that "[o]verall, most program managers in
both the government and private industry reported that the acquisi-
tion improvement program [the so-called 'Carlucci Initiatives,'
drafted in 1981 by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Car-
lucci] has made little or no difference in the acquisition process." 26
While that survey may be an accurate reflection of what GAO was
told, I think the conclusion is too harsh. The financial impact of the
procurement changes may be slow in coming, for reasons discussed
above, but the attitude among the participants has changed consid-
erably - in many cases, changed for the better. We in industry are
less complacent, more responsive, and able to move more quickly to
solve problems.
From a senior government auditor, who is more sensitive to the
warts in the system than most, come words of confidence:
Restoring public confidence in government contracting cannot be
done at the expense of driving private enterprise out of the market.
Profit must be encouraged, when it is based upon productivity and
successful contract performance. Working successfully and profitably
with the federal government is not an easy task, but it can be done.
The results can be rewarding not only monetarily, but also emotionally
- i.e, the satisfaction of having done something worthwhile for your
country.27
25. Fossedal, supra note 18, at col. 5.
26. Thompson, GAO Casts a Shadow on Procurement Steps, Washington Post, Nov. 13,
1986, at A9, col. 1.
27. Newton, Restoring Public Confidence in Government Contractors, MANAGEMENT Ac-




The alternative to those rewards and satisfaction is to turn away
from doing business with the government. In an environment of
mistrust, of regulation that stifles innovation and cripples profitabil-
ity, the competition that is desired may be diminished, as prudent
managers turn to more attractive sources of revenue. To evaluate
the proper course, to balance the best interests of all concerned, is a
goal within our reach, when we recognize the unique aspects of the
defense business and respond with fairness and equity.
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